I. Introduction
The boundary school, we are told by the editors of this volume (Elfring and Volberda 1997) , is a serious candidate for playing the role of a synthesizing school in strategic management. It bears promise of being able to organize crucial strategic issues and to draw on complementary insights.
As indicated by its name, the boundary school may be understood as a compilation of theories that are all concerned with analyzing what economists (and some organization theorists) refer to as "the boundaries of the firm". 1 In economics, the boundaries of the firm are normally defined in terms of ownership (Hart 1995) : if firm A has ownership rights over asset a and firm B does not, asset a is inside the boundaries of firm A and outside the boundaries of firm B. More generally, the boundaries of firm A are defined by those assets that firm A owns. This has implications for the way that the boundaries issue is normally understood in the management studies, namely as the organization of transactions, for assets and transactions are usually bundled. 2 Therefore, an aspect of the boundaries of the firm is the issue of which activities or transactions should be undertaken in firms (hierarchies), which should take place in various intermediate forms (such as franchising, licensing arrangements, long-term supplier contracts, joint-ventures, etc), and which should be handled in "anonymous" markets. These are the issues that are treated in different ways by the various approaches that may be seen as constituting the boundary school. Evidently, they are of paramount strategic significance. For example, the issues of diversification, outsourcing, partnering, strategic alliances, virtual corporations, how foreign markets should be serviced, etc. all directly involve the issue of the boundaries of the firm.
From a mainstream strategy perspective (e.g., the resource-based perspective), the boundaries of the firm would seem to derive their importance from the fact that they determine the firm's sourcing of resources (in house or market sourcing), co-determine the terms at which resources may be acquired, influence the extent to which rents may be appropriated from, for example, valuable knowledge, etc. Thus, in such a scheme, the boundaries issue is seen to be directly relevant to the issue of sustained competitive advantage, arguably the key issue in strategy (content) research. This is because knowing something about a firm's boundaries (and therefore also its contracts), also tells us something about how and how efficiently strategic resources are organized.
But there is more to it; for a firm's boundaries, including in a wider reading, its relations to, for example, outside suppliers, may in themselves constitute strategic resources, as in the case of Marks and Spencer.
From both a scientific and a normative perspective, we wish to know which entities and mechanisms are determinative of observed boundary choices. Innovation? Production costs? Knowledge-accumulation? Dependence considerations? Transaction costs? Intuitively, they would all seem relevant to some degree, but which factors are the most important, which may legitimately be kept in the background or abstracted from, and how is the mix between causal factors constituted in different situations? Should we rely on a power perspective or on an efficiency perspective for answering these questions? Etc.
Thus, there are many and difficult questions that have a bearing on the issue under consideration here − questions that are addressed and answered in different ways by different approaches in economics and sociological organization theory. And it should be recognized from the outset that talking about "the boundary school" is what doctrinal historians call a "rational reconstruction". To put it more bluntly, there may not be such thing as a distinct boundary school in existence. However, there are undeniably a number of related theories that share an interest in a well-defined set of issues, and that may be overlapping or complementary. From a practical point of view, it may therefore make sense to talk about a "school" in the sense of a box of tools that may be applied to problem-solving in practice. To discuss this is one of the purposes of the present paper.
Among the theories that may be seen as constituting the boundary school are various manifestations of transaction cost economics, most notably Oliver Williamson's (1985 Williamson's ( , 1996 brand, the resource-dependency approach originally developed by Jeffrey Pfeffer and Gerald Salanzick (1978) , various approaches to industrial networks (e.g., Axelsson and Easton 1992) and also the capabilities approach to firms (Penrose 1959; Richardson, 1972; Langlois and Robertson 1995; Langlois and Foss 1997) .
Of course, the boundaries of the firm issue has always been center stage in the more explicitly managerial literature. For example, the make or buy decision is one of the classics of strategy, and has continuously received attention from management writers, such as in its recent guise under the rubric of "outsourcing". Similarly, the issue of the boundaries of the firm has emerged in all sorts of managerial discussions on, for example, diversification. However, it is characteristic of the more managerial literature that it is not explicitly founded in theory, and that this produces ambiguities. 3 I shall therefore stick to the four theories identified above.
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For example, it has often been asserted that vertical integration may arise because a downstream firm may wish to have timely delivery or a certain quality level of its inputs. Or, vertical integration is seen a means to break "bottlenecks" in the value chain. While all these motives may be real motives, and quite legitimate ones, we would still like to know why, for example, a long-term contract cannot handle these problems of delivery, quality, etc., and why vertical integration is required.
I shall also argue that some of these theories are related in various ways, ways that will be examined in more detail in the following. For example, there are some parallels between the (sociological) resource-dependency approach and transaction cost economics; many networks arguments can be given a straightforward transaction cost interpretation; capabilities and transaction cost resasoning may be fruitfully combined; etc.
The purpose of the present chapter is to further emphasize the strategic importance of the issue of the boundaries of the firm, to present a map of sorts over "the boundary school", and to to speculate on how the diverse constituent theories of this school connect. More specifically, I shall put forward and defend the following propositions:
•
The issue of the boundaries of the firm is a crucial strategic issue; it goes right to the heart of corporate strategy and also involves business and functional strategy (Section II, "The Strategic Importance of Firm Boundaries").
• There are a number of theoretical approaches that, from different underlying disciplines, have approached the issue. To some extent these approaches can be harmonized; however, in some dimensions they are in conflict (Section III, "Alternative Theories of the Boundaries of the Firm", section IV, "Implications").
• Because of this, and other difficulties, such as the lack of clarity as to what exactly constitutes the boundaries of the firm, the strategic implications of the boundary school are not entirely clear. Further research and attempts to clarify and synthesize are needed (Section IV and V, "Implications", "Concluding Comments")
Assuredly, these are issues that individually may warrant a separate paper; the present paper must therefore necessarily be somewhat sketchy at times.
II. The Strategic Importance of Firm Boundaries

A. Strategizing and Economizing
Oliver Williamson (1994) − the flagbearer of the arguably most important economic approach belonging to the boundary school, namely the transaction cost approach − recently argued that there is a sharp distinction between "economizing" (on transaction and production costs) and "strategizing" (by engaging in various clever ploys against other players in product markets). An important aspect of "economizing" is to choose the boundaries of the firm correctly; lest this is done, the firm may suffer severe transaction and production cost penalties. Moreover, Williamson argued that economizing is superior to strategizing:
"...economizing is much more fundamental than strategizing. This is because strategizing is relevant principally to firms that possess market power − which are a small fraction of the total ... I advance the argument that ... economy is the best strategy. That is the central and unchanging message of the transaction cost economics perspective ... To be sure, economizing and strategizing are not mutally exclusive. Strategic ploys are sometimes used to disguise economic weaknesses" (Williamson 1994: 362; emph. in original) .
In contrast, I here advance the argument that Professor Williamson confuses strategy in general with a very specific model of strategy, namely the one derived from industrial economics (e.g., Porter 1980) . Admittedly, this model does emphasize tactical ploys, threats, etc. However, the strategy field in general is not at all committed to this specific model; for example, it is questioned by the recent resource-based school in strategy research (Foss 1997a ). This misunderstanding leads Williamson to portray a false relation between strategizing and economizing. Not only is economizing often an important aspect of strategizing, but strategizing considerations sometimes overrule economizing, and rightly so. 4 Strategizing decisions are concerned with the creation of rents through strategic and entrepreneurial initiative;
economizing, on the other hand, is concerned with increasing rents through reducing inefficiencies. 5 But these are not in conflict; they are complementary aspects of the rent-creation process.
Williamson presumably would not disagree with the main point of this section − that the boundaries of the firm is a variable of paramount strategic importance. At any rate, principles relating to the boundaries of the firm are increasingly being translated into more managerial prose and are explicitly seen as being of strategic significance, as witness, for example, the work of the highly respected transaction cost theorists, Paul Rubin (1990) and Paul Milgrom and John Roberts (1992) . Thus, economizing and strategizing are not opposed.
On the contrary, economizing considerations will usually accompany strategizing considerations; the two perspectives complement each other. In the following, I discuss a number of issues in which the boundaries of the firm enter as a crucial choice variable and in which an economizing orientation is also appropriate.
B. The Boundaries of the Firm as a Strategic Variable
Chandler on the Corporation
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For example, firms may engage in substantial knowledge exchange and learning from other firms, although this may expose them to serious transaction cost problems. However, the longterm benefits easily outweigh short-term transaction costs. Similar points will be elaborated later.
Consider as a first illustration of the importance − indeed, the crucial importance − of the boundaries of the firm as a strategic variable the work of Alfred Chandler's (e.g., 1962 Chandler's (e.g., , 1990 ). This work is the standard reference on the emergence of the corporate form, and particularly on the emergence of the diversified company and the change in organizational structures that, at least in the US, accompanied increasing diversification. Chandler's basic story can be summarized as follows.
Technological change, particularly the telegraph, the railroad, the steamship and the cable allowed a tremendous increase in the extent of the market − one that opened up a huge potential for scale-based mass-production with an emphasis on "economies of speed" (Chandler, 1962) . This created a strong need for coordination. The organizational and technological innovations required for taking advantage of the new opportunities complementary, in the sense that doing more of one of the activities increased the returns from doing more of the other activity (Milgrom and Roberts 1992) . Moreover, the relevant innovation were often "systemic" in nature, that is, they required simultaneous changes in adjacent stages of production. Finally, large geographical distances were involved. All of this required intensive coordinative efforts.
The institution that arose to take advantage of the opportunities presented by the technologically induced widening of markets and solve the accompanying coordination problems was the modern corporation. This institution possessed the coordinative capability not possessed by the market organization under the specific regime of economic change then prevailing in the American economy. Or, to be more precise, the corporation mobilized the required coordinative capability that would have been prohibitively costly to organize in the context of market relations. (Thus, strategizing and economizing join hands). In fact, William Lazonick (1991) seem to sharpen
Chandler's argument into the proposition that undertaking the massive, systemic innovations in processes and organization that were undertaken by the early American corporations is something the market is inherently incapable of. 6 Chandler's (and certainly Lazonick's) argument may sometimes read as a ringing endorsement of the merits of vertical integration. Indeed, according to Chandler (1990) , being big and heavily vertically integrated is a necessary condition for successful performance, at least on the global arena; this best makes it possible to stimulate efficient throughput, innovation and development of capabilities. The highly vertically integrated company is currently out of fashion, and at any rate, Chandler's views are flatly contradicted by those who advocate "the virtual corporation", to wit, the relatively short-lived but very flexible partnering that develops in order to reap temporary technological opportunities, as the organizational form of the future, by various advocates of "networking", of "industrial districts" and the like.
The point here is that these disagreements stem from different understandings of the strategic implications of the boundary choice. For example, there is an underlying disagreement whether productive and innovative capabilities be created and nurtured across the boundaries of several networked firms or cannot.
Outsourcing
Another − but related − example has to do with the highly topical debate on outsourcing (as summarized in Bettis, Bradley and Hamel, 1992) . Outsourcing simply means letting suppliers take over activities that were once undertaken inhouse; thus, it is an instance of vertical disintegration. Because it allows the firm to 6 Richard Langlois and Paul Robertson (1995) , on the other hand, argue that the market is capable of accomplishing a great deal more than Lazonick claims − innovative capability does not rest solely with the corporate form of organization. For example, the development of the PC is an example of the strong innovative capabilities that may reside in a network of competing and cooperating relatively small firms. get access to the high-powered incentives of market supply (rather than the dulled incentives of internal procurement), and because it allows the firm to eliminate some fixed costs, outsourcing may be an attractive strategy, particularly for lagging business units. Moreover, a clever outsourcing strategy freed financial resources that can be used for expanding core business.
However, unless it is carefully executed, outsourcing may be associated with serious perils. In fact, the critics of outsourcing (such as Bettis, Bradley and Again the point is that a boundary choice − whether to vertically disintegrate or not − strongly influences longer-run strategic considerations, whether management is aware of this or not. For example, outsourcing activities that are close to the corporate core to partners whose intentions are ill-understood seriously risk harming longer-run knowledge-building efforts.
C. Implications and Desiderata
The upshot of this section is that the boundary choice relates to a number of crucial strategic issues. Extrapolating somewhat from the examples given, the boundary choice may be seen to be directly relevant to decisions relating to diversification, make and buy, outsourcing, participation in business networks, strategic alliances, joint-ventures, franchising, etc. etc. To put it briefly, virtually all issues of corporate strategy involves the boundaries of the firm.
As traditionally understood, corporate strategy involves the twin issues of 1) which markets the firm should be operative in, and 2) how divisions should be managed. Obviously, the boundaries of the firm issue is directly relevant to the first issue, since this issue can be reformulated as a matter of where the firm's efficient boundaries should lie. However, the other issue is also relevant. For managing a division from a corporate headquarters is only justified to the extent that the headquarters add more value to the operation of the division; otherwise, it would be more efficient to let the division stand alone (as a separate legal entity) or perhaps let it be owned by another firm. But obviously, these considerations again involve the boundaries issue, since they raise the issue of who should own (and control) the division (i.e., the assets of the division).
The boundaries issue also relates to business strategy, since choosing the right boundaries may be conducive to both a low cost or a quality strategy.
For example, both strategies may require some vertical integration, albeit for different reasons (controlling throughput vs controlling the quality of inputs).
Moreover, where the boundaries are drawn may also relate to the issue of appropriability, because a higher degree of vertical integration may help keep would-be imitators at bay (by making the firm more complex and hence more difficult to imitate and by more control over knowledge flows).
Indeed, to the extent that one views strategy as a matter of accumulating and deploying valuable bundles of knowledge assets − such as capabilities or core competencies − and appropriating the rents from these assets, the boundaries issue enters the picture as a crucial one. For example, collaboration between firms − a specific way of drawing the boundaries of the firm − may provide opportunities for firms to internalize the skills of their partners (e.g., Hamel 1991) . The boundary choice therefore influences the possibilities of reaping rents from the firms' scarce resources and capabilities, not only because it influences appropriability (knowledge protection), but also because it is a mechanism behind knowledge aquisition.
As a general normative matter, we may therefore suggest that the boundaries of the firm (in both the vertical and the horizontal dimensions) should be chosen so that these rents are maximized. 7 A specific desideratum clearly is that we would like to know more about the connection between the boundary choice and the accumulation of capabilities. We have substantial relevant empirical evidence − for example, from the debate on outsourcing, from business history, etc. − but it is more doubtful that we have theorizing that is adequate to allow us to approach the issue in all its complexities. The following section addresses theories of the boundaries of the firm in some detail.
III. Alternative Theories of the Boundaries of the Firm
Theories of the boundaries of the firm are a fretful lot. They identify different aspects of the boundaries of the firm and different explanatory mechanisms behind these, they are drawn from different disciplines, and, not surprisingly, 7 As we shall see, transaction cost economics formally allows us to say where the boundaries should be drawn so that quasi-rents (joint surplus) on assets are maximied. But this theory does not say anything about maximizing rents from knowledge acquisition that is brought about in, for example, a joint venture (although it may not be incapable of doing this). The theory is essentially about how the boundaries of the firm connect with the appropriability question rather than about how the boundaries of the firm connect with asset-building. they reach different managerial implications. One partial reason for the plurality of theories of the boundaries of the firm is that these theories are, at least in economics, derived from more general theories of the firm. And economics has witnessed a virtual explosion of work on the theory of the firm over the last 15 to 20 years. In this section, I review what I see as the primary contestants, beginning with the arguably most highly developed theory, 8 or, rather, theories, namely transaction cost theories.
A. Transaction Cost Theories: Coase, Williamson and Hart
Transaction cost theories of the boundaries of the firm includes, most notably, the edifice that Oliver Williamson has been constructing over the last three decades. 9 However, the story begins with Ronald Coase. What Coase observed was that, in the world of standard neoclassical economics, firms have no reason to exist. According to the economics textbook, the decentralized price system is the ideal structure for carrying out economic coordination. Why then do we observe some transactions to be removed from the price system to the interior of organizations called firms? The answer, Coase reasoned, must be that there is a "cost to using the price mechanism" (Coase 1937, p. 390) . Thus was born the idea of transaction costs: costs that stand separate from and in addition to ordinary production costs. In the 1937 article, Coase lists several sources of those "costs of using the price mechanism" that give rise to the institution of the firm. In part, these are the costs of writing contracts. The "most obvious cost of 'organising' production through the price mechanism is that of discovering what the relevant prices are" (Coase 1937, p. 390) . A second type of cost is that of executing separate contracts for each of the multifold market transactions that would be necessary to coordinate some complex production activity.
These costs can be avoided by firm organization.
However, Coase's basic insights were essentially neglected until the beginning of the 1970s. Since then the economics of transaction costs as applied to organization has burgeoned into a major subfield in the economics discipline, and has had a strong influence in the organization and strategy departments of business schools, no doubt because the theory addresses core issues in organization and strategy in a precise and convincing manner. 10 An early development was Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and Jensen and Meckling (1976) , two seminal and founding contributions of that brand of transaction cost economics that is often referred to as "nexus of contracts" theory. However, it is characteristic of this brand that the very notion of the boundaries of the firm is very elusive: It is not really clear what is "inside" and what is "outside" the firm. 11 Because these theories essentially deny the central phenomenon under discussion here, I take the step of disregarding them in the following pages, and proceed instead to the other dominant branch of transaction cost economics, namely that associated with Williamson.
Building on Coasian foundations and mixing these with essential ideas of the Carnegie-Mellon school in organization theory (notably bounded 10 However, it has met with steadfast resistance and critique among more traditionally minded organization scholars. The most recent and probably most sophisticated attack on organizational economics (in the guise of Williamson's transaction cost theory) is Ghoshal and Moran (1996) . rationality) and his own ideas (such as that of opportunism), Williamson has over more than three decades constructed an impressive, if sometimes unnecessarily complicated, theoretical edifice. Perhaps most notably, he has been instrumental in extending the traditional concern with the theory of the firm to a much broader concern with economic organization in general. Williamson (1985 Williamson ( , 1996 contingencies Once the contract is signed and the assets deployed, one of the parties may use some unforeseen contingency (e.g., changing demand or technology) to effect a "hold-up". For example, he may demand a price reduction and support this by threatening to pull out of the arrangementthereby reducing the value of the specific assets -unless a greater share of the quasi-rents of joint production find their way into the threat-maker's pockets.
Fear of such "hold up" ex post will affect investment choices ex ante. In the absence of appropriate contractual safeguards, the transacting parties may choose less specific -and therefore less specialized and less productivetechnology. If, by contrast, the transacting parties were to pool their capital into a single enterprise in whose profits they jointly shared, or if one of the parties were given all ownership rights to the relevant assets, the incentives for unproductive rent-seeking would be attenuated, and the more productive specialized technology would be chosen. reasons, it may be efficient to place the residual rights of control in the hands of only one of the parties by giving that party ownership of both sets of assets. In general, the owner ought to be the party whose possession of the residual right minimizes rent-seeking costs, which typically means the party whose contribution to the quasirents of cooperation is greater.
Thus, the incomplete contracts literature allows us to say who should (efficiently) own which assets (that is, who integrates whom). Moreover, it does something few have been able to do before: to define the boundaries of the firm in a consistent and unambiguous way. Thus, a firm is defined by the bundle of assets under common ownership. This "formal" definition of the firm and its boundaries is somewhat at variance with the next approach to be considered.
B. The Resource Dependence Approach
The ( Perspective. In the context of organization theory, the approach is perhaps best thought of as an important correction to structural contingency theory. Where the theory asserted that firms had to adopt internal structure to external contingencies, Pfeffer and Salancik elaborated the essentially simple point that firms may as well try to influence these contingencies and environments rather than passively responding to them. Although others have made contributions and the approach has been extended somewhat, I here refer to this classic contribution exclusively. 13 Pfeffer and Salancik essentially follow Cyert and March (1963) in assuming that firms try to accumulate slack resources and profits, and that they will actively influence their environments in order to reach this end. One way 13 In contrast to the other parts of the boundary school that are under consideration here, it is doubtful whether there really still is a viable resource dependence approach. Already in 1982, Pfeffer assimilated the approach with the population ecology perspective (Pfeffer 1982) . However, the justification for including it here is that Pfeffer and Salancik's book is still a standard reference in much organization theory literature on firm boundaries.
of accomplishing this is to reduce dependence on external factors, such as other firms. 14 Dependence is conceptualized thus:
"Concentration of the control over discretion over resources and the importance of the resources to the organization together determine the focal organization's dependence on any given other group or organization. Dependence can then be defined as the product of the importance of a given input or output to the organization and the extent to which it is controlled by a relatively few organizations" (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978: 51) . Now, reducing dependence may take place through strategies that involve direct changes of the boundaries of the firm, that is, the transferring of ownership titles to various assets. This is essentially the cases mainly examined in transaction cost economics, and include vertical integration, diversification, and horizontal integration. In fact, the resource-dependence approach sometimes reads as a sort of sociological version of transaction cost economics, among other things, because of the distinction between various sorts of interdependencies. For example, the distinction between "reciprocal" and "asymmetric" interdependence (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978: 52-3 ) is a complete pendant to the concepts of "complementary" and "specific assets" of transaction cost economics.
However, it would be clearly wrong to say that the resource dependence approach is no more than a sociological version of transaction cost 14 In other words, it is seen as desirable to reduce the "power" of other firms over one's firm. There is a presumption in the resource-dependency perspective that dependence is "bad" and that firms will actively seek to avoid this. From a transaction cost perspective, this does not necessarily make sense if contracting is "seen in its entirety" (Williamson 1996) . This is because even relations that are characterized by a high degree of dependence may be well-working, efficient, desirable, etc. because they are supported by the appropriate governance mechanisms (e.g., hostages).
economics. One aspect, of course, is that the approach is not an efficiency approach, but is rather based on power considerations and on uncertainty reduction (rather than the maximization of rents) as an overriding motive of economic actors. More to the point, however, Pfeffer and Salancik forcefully argue that reduction of dependence may also be accomplished through other, less formal, means than direct ownership, such as the formation of cartels, business associations, social norms, interlocking boards of directors, etc.
In other words, they introduce the important distinction (well-known from sociology) between "real" and "formal control", a distinction that has not been recognized in economics (at least until rather recently, cf. Hart 1995).
These latter strategies make the firm's environment a negotiated environment (Grandori 1987: 61) , and will sometimes be chosen because they confer coordination and particularly flexibility benefits that direct ownership may not confer. As Pfeffer and Salancik argue, anticipating recent ideas on the virtual corporation: "Relationships established through communication and consensus can be established, renegotiated, and reestablished with more ease than the integration of organizations by merger can be altered" (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978: 145) . That "informal" cooperative strategies may sometimes be more flexible than direct ownership is also a theme of the next approach to be considered.
C. Network Approaches
During the last two decades, many scholars have written about firm networks, particularly in an industrial marketing context, and several distinct groups of network theorists may be distinguished, for example, in the UK and in Sweden (Axelsson and Easton 1992). Moreover, "network" has increasingly become a strategic management buzzword, and has now lost its earlier almost exclusive affiliation with industrial marketing. Finally, contributors to the network approach appear to draw on a diversity of different disciplines, insights and contributions, for example, exchange sociology, organizational economics, the resourcedependency approach, sociological work on networks and embeddedness, etc.
Accordingly, it is not easy to reconstruct a set of well-defined themes that run through the various contributions to "the" network approach. However, the following related broad ideas may perhaps be singled out as common themes.
First, there is a view that networks of cooperating firms are quite pervasive social institutions. 15 As Thorelli (1986) says "The point taken here is that the entire economy may be viewed as a network of organizations with a vast hierarchy of sub-ordinate, criss-crossing networks" (Thorelli 1986: 38) .
Second, networks are seen as structuring exchange relations on a par with hierarchies and markets, and to be just as worthy of scientific inquiry. The firm's "environment" is a complex context consisting of heterogeneous competitors and cooperating firms who condition the firm's behavior. Therefore, proponents of the network approach are often highly critical of those theories and approaches which they take to portray firms as confronting anonymous environment (such as mainstream strategic management or industrial organization) (Håkansson and Snehote 1989) .
Third, trust is seen as a much more descriptively accurate assumption about firm interaction than, in particular, opportunism (Johansson and Mattson 1987) , since empirical research has revealed many cases of firms willingly putting themselves in the position of risking to be opportunistically held-up. 16 Trust is gradually built in long-lived business relations. Indeed, the typical and interesting kind of interaction envisaged as taking place between the firms in the network is informal contacts made by actors with close interpersonal relations. 15 An idea that is strongly supported by the new economic sociology (e.g., Granovetter 1985) . 16 For an extended critique of this argument, see Foss and Koch (1996) .
Fourth, as in the resource dependence perspective, on which many contributors to the network approach draw, power and its distribution among the actors of the network are assumed to be important. Underlying the distributions of power between actors are in turn relations of dependence between the participants.
As noted by Johanson and Mattsson (1987: 36) , it is "A basic assumption in the network model ... that the individual firm is dependent on resources controlled by other firms", but there is not in the network approach the same of drama associated with this condition as in the resource dependence perspective.
Fifth, long-lived, trust-based network relations are seen as supporting individual firms' processes of accumulation of resources and capabilities (Jarillo, 1993) . Firms engage themselves in repeated interaction with other firms in order to obtain access to the complementary but dissimilar resources and capabilities of other firms, and to ease their own accumulation processes. Moreover, firms may obtain the benefits of diversity (including diversity in technological experimentation) from participation in broad networks (Foss 1997d However, I think that it is fair to say that the network approach is not a theory about the boundaries of the firm proper. At least, it does not at all match the transaction cost approach (which its proponents so often criticize) in terms of precise insights in this issue. However, network ideas are certainly relevant for understanding, for example, the connection between information acquisition and the boundaries of the firm, or how social embeddedness may influence where these boundaries are located. Thus, the network approach is in the end more a theory of firm learning and of the firm's embeddedness that it is an approach directed at understanding firm boundaries. Something similar may be perhaps be said of the next approach to be considered.
D. The Capabilities Approach
How can firms make best use of their distinctive capabilities? How have they done this in the past? And how can they go on developing new valuable capabilities? Such questions have been central in the strategy field since its inception at the end of the 1950s. According to the editors of the present book (Elfring and Volberda, 1997) , the capabilities perspective (or "school"), which is a collection of resource-based and evolutionary perspectives on the firm, is in fact one of the important candidates for playing the role of a synthesizing school in the context of strategic management research. However, as I briefly argue here, there is some overlap between the boundary school and the capabilities school, since the latter also contains insights of relevance for the issue of the boundaries of the firm.
In a very brief signallement, the capabilities school may be said to be founded on the common-sense recognition that individuals -and organizations -are necessarily limited in what they know how to do well. time is determined by administrative decision" (Penrose 1959, p. 24) . Now, resources in Penrose's view yield services, and it is these services − clearly a theoretical precursor to the concept of capabilities − that interest her the most. Although resources/services are firm-specific, they are nevertheless somewhat "fungible" inside the firm, and, when in excess, provide a steppingstone for diversifying to new markets. Clearly, this is a first stab at a theory of firm boundaries that is based on capabilities considerations. Later research (e.g., Teece 1982) has further refined Penrose's story; in fact, Penrose's notion of deploying excess capabilities to neighboring markets, combined with transaction-cost considerations, is perhaps the dominant mode of explanation in diversification studies (Montgomery 1994) .
Roughly speaking, the story is this. As firms carry on their normal business, they are likely to accumulate excess resources, for example, excess managerial capabilities. In principle, rents from these resources may be captured in different ways, for example, through market exchange, long-term contracts, or in-house use. Because of transaction-cost problems, which may be particularly severe when the excess resources involved are knowledge resources, in-house use is more efficient, and the firm will accordingly apply the resources that are in excess to neighboring markets.
A few years after Penrose, British economist George Richardson (1972) even more explicitly tied together the issues of capabilities and the boundaries of the firm. In Richardson's terminology, production can be broken down into various stages or activities (á la Porter 1985) . Some activities are similar, in that they draw on the same general capabilities. Activities can also be complementary in that they are connected in the chain of production and therefore need to be coordinated with one another. Juxtaposing different degrees of similarity against different degrees of complementarity produces a matrix that maps different types of economic organization. For example, closely complementary and similar activities may be best undertaken under unified governance.
Closely complementary, but dissimilar, activities, on the other hand, are best undertaken in some sort of inter-firm arrangement.
As the examples of Penrose and Richardson demonstrates, the capabilities perspective clearly has important implications for the boundaries of the firm. In fact, a number of writers have recently suggested that it is a perspective on this issue that is distinct from the transaction cost approach(es) (Foss 1993; Langlois and Robertson 1995; Langlois and Foss 1997) . 
E. Summing Up
Given what has been said in the preceding pages about the possible constituent theories of the boundary school, we may now sum up their main characteristics in a more synoptic form, as in Table 1 . 
Unit of Analysis
The transaction The dependence relation
The relation Capabilities
Time frame Note that these "dynamic transaction costs" (Langlois and Robertson 1995) are in a different category from the transaction costs usually considered in the modern economics of organization. Transacting difficulties are not a matter of incentive problems within an otherwise well-defined and well-understood exchange context, but a matter of basic coordination problems. For evidence of this view, see Chandler (1962) and Langlois and Robertson (1995 
IV. Implications
A. Differences and Ambiguities
As Thus, the differences seem to be more pronounced than the similarities.
On the overall level, this threatens the very project of talking about a boundary school. Evidently, it is rather meaningless to claim a school to exist simply because a diversity of theories share some explanandum, and particularly so if the theories stand in a rivalrous relation; on the contrary, we should talk about a multifold of schools. Of course, there will be no clear managerial implications from what is merely a collection of heterogeneous, and perhaps even conflicting, theories. Thus, what is really at stake here is the relation between the theories that we take to constitute the boundary school. I examine this issue in the following pages.
B. Relations Between the Theories of the Boundary School
The methodological comparison of different theories is a notoriously difficult area (see, e.g., Krajewski 1977) , and I will not here go into all the philosophical difficulties, but just venture a few suggestions. 18 As a starting point, we may ask whether the theories are commensurable in the sense that they share domain of application. 
C. A Pragmatic Research Strategy
Although it is undeniably the case that there are many and deep-seated differences between the explanatory apparatuses that are employed by the four approaches, some of these differences may do more to differentiate the approaches from each other than other differences. For example, it may be argued that the fact that the network, resource-dependence and capabilities approaches do not make substantial use of the incentive-alignment arguments of transaction cost economics is a relatively unimportant difference, since these arguments can be integrated with the core ideas of the first three approaches. For example, we may ask, Given that we wish to engage ourselves in learning through network interaction, are the right incentives in place? That is, is there a sufficient number of credible commitments (cf. Williamson 1985) and are relations of trust sufficiently widespread (cf.
Williamson 1996: chapter 10) that we dare take the risk of, for example, making some of our critical knowledge visible to network partners?
Thus, a pragmatic research strategy may be to combine those aspects of the four approaches that can usefully be aligned − and side-step the more troublesome aspects. This is in line with the approach taken to synthesizing schools by Elfring and Volberda (1997) , who basically take the stance that it is possible to align approaches in a practical dimension, where the practical problem statements with which managers are confronted serve as the synthesizing mechanisms. The real goal is to solve the problem and it is legitimate to draw on many perspectives; what counts is the ability of a combination of theories to bring new and real insight.
Obviously, such an eclectic approach does not get killed by arguments that, for example, underlying assumptions are in conflict.
To continue this sort of reasoning, there may be practical problem areas where the theories under consideration here complement each other in the sense that one of the theories is made richer by including some insights and propositions of the other theory. Consider the following points as impressionistic exemplifications of this:
• The resource-dependence approach points to the importance of non-formal mechanisms of control and dependence reduction and to the flexibility advantages this may sometimes confer. This clearly complement the formal perspective on control (ownership) in transaction cost theories.
• The network and capabilities approaches point to the importance of the boundaries of the firm for building knowledge assets. This is again a complement to transaction cost theorie.
• Transaction cost theories, on the other hand, provides an understanding of the economic mechanisms (e.g., hostages and other credible commitments) that underlie the long-lived trust relations, discussed in the network approach.
• The network approach adds a conceptualization of being embedded in a web of cooperating and competing firms that complements the rather "introspective" stance of the capabilities approach.
• The network approach also helps theorize market transaction costs by pointing to the importance of trust relations, etc.
• The focus on the longer-run issue of knowledge building that characterize the capabilities and the network approach complement the shorter-run focus on transaction minimization and power and dependence that characterize the transaction cost and resource-dependence approaches. In fact, these are considerations that should be balanced against each other; arguably, there is a trade-off, akin to the one between static and dynamic efficiency, between them.
At any rate, pursuing a myopic "economizing" strategy exclusively is a guaranteed recipe for longer-run sub-optimization.
As inspection of the above points indicates, there is a large potential for integrating selected insights from the four approaches, and in many practical situations it will no doubt be advantageous to rely on more than one perspective.
But the integrative potential is not only a matter of practical concerns; it is increasingly becoming a theoretical issue.
In fact, a growing number of contributions have emerged that are founded on the conviction that combining key ideas of some of the above approaches is a fruitful research strategy. For example, David Teece (1982) suggested to combine capabilities and transaction cost considerations for understanding efficient diversification, and he later used the same set of ideas for discussing the firm's innovation boundaries (Teece 1987) . Torger Reve (1990) and John Kay (1993) also used transaction cost ideas and capabilities ideas to construct a strategic theory of the firm, while Foss and Koch (1996) argued that network ideas and transaction costs were to some extent overlapping, and where this was not the case, the two approaches were complementary rather than contradictory. These integrative efforts 19 imply that it may, after all, be increasingly meaningful to talk about "a boundary school".
V. Conclusions
This paper has been concerned with analyzing the boundary school within contemporary strategic management. The main conclusions can be summarized thus:
• There is no contrast between economizing (on transaction and production costs) and strategizing (creating new sources of rents); rather the two perspectives relate to different aspects of the rent-creation process.
19 Much of the literature is surveyed and discussed in Langlois and Foss (1997) .
Moreover, both may involve the boundaries of the firm. They are, accordingly, complementary.
• The boundaries of the firm is a central strategic issue, as evidenced by both business history (e.g., Chandler 1962 ) and more topical issues in strategic management (e.g., the debate on outsourcing). It relates directly to issues such diversification, vertical integration, joint ventures, strategic alliances, etc.
• The approaches that may be seen as composing the boundary school − the transaction cost approach, the resource dependence approach, the network approach and the capabilities approach − differ in a number of dimensions, such as the disciplines they draw on. Some emphasize static incentive alignment (the transaction cost approach), or power considerations (the resource dependence approach), while others put more of an emphasis on knowledge accumulation issues (the network approach and the capabilities approach).
• However, it has been argued that these different approaches are complementary, and that their essential insights might, and indeed should, be combined in an integrated model. Thus, it may, after all, be possible to begin to meaningfully speak of a boundary school.
